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11 Introduction
Beginning in the late 1980s, developing countries, with Latin American and Caribbean
countries taking the lead, began allowing signiﬁcant private sector participation in the
provision of infrastructure services by transferring parts of utilities’ operation from gov-
ernment management and control to that of private enterprises.1 In addition to attempting
to improve eﬃciency by better management, one of the leading reason behind the strat-
egy to bring private sector participation in infrastructure was the urgent need for sizable
investment to improve performance and coverage. Given the scarcity of public funds for
investments and the competing needs in the social sectors, most countries opted for the
transfer of the provision of infrastructure services to the private sector. Private sector
participation can and has been accomplished with signiﬁcant success in a variety of forms,
ranging from management contracts, to concessions and to full privatizations. Practically,
at least in Latin America and the Caribbean region, seldom a call to the private sector
to take over and operate an infrastructure service has had no taker.
In sectors such as telecommunications, and to some extent in electricity generation
and gas (the often pioneer sectors), private sector participation was accomplished by
outright privatization-divestiture, accompanied by structural reforms of market structure
and of the regulatory framework. However, in many cases, particularly for the transport2
(ports, airports, roads and railroads), water and sewage sectors, and some segments of
the electricity sector, legal, political and constitutional restraints hindered or made very
diﬃcult the outright sale of public infrastructure utilities to private parties, who quite
often were foreign companies, making the issue even more complicated. Many countries,
therefore, resorted to innovative strategies for introducing private sector participation in
the provision of public infrastructure services when the state could not or did not want to
transfer ownership of public assets to private agents. Amongst the alternatives to outright
privatization, concessions to the private sector for the right to operate the service for a
limited length of time have emerged as the salient mode. A concession is the right to
use the assets of a former state company for a limited period of time (usually 20 to
30 years), being fully responsible for all investments and having to secure a number of
targets speciﬁed in the contract. At the end of the concession, all the assets go back to
the government, so de facto the concession’s only asset, in contrast to privatization, is the
right to the cash-ﬂow of the users’ receipts from the service. Throughout the last 15 years,
concessions have been used in 67% of the private sector participation cases worldwide, all
sectors included.
Despite some gains and improvements in infrastructure sector performance, private
1See for example Sanchez and Corona (1993) and Harris (2003).
2On the transport sector, see G´ omez-Ib´ a˜ nez and Meyer (1993).
2sector participation by concession has often produced mixed results, raising, in a number
of countries, questions about the concession model. Among them are frequent conﬂicts
with operators in complying with contract clauses, tariﬀs perceived to be excessive, aban-
donment of the concession by the operator or the taking over of the concession by the
government as a result of claimed bankruptcy of the operator3, discontent with price lev-
els and services, poor attention to users, and above all, the perceived high incidence of
renegotiation of contracts shortly after the award of the concession, often to the detri-
ment of consumer welfare. In most cases, particularly in the water and transport sectors,
contracts have been renegotiated, impacting sector performance and compromising the
credibility of the country and sector involved. In Latin America, 53% of the concessions
in the transport sector and 76% of those in the water sector were renegotiated, and this
took place on average only 3.1 and 1.6 years after the signing of the contract respectively.
Moreover, this recorded high incidence of renegotiation is likely to be underestimated,
since the process is ongoing and additional concessions will probably be renegotiated in
the coming years.
Some renegotiation is desirable and is to be expected as contracts are in practice
necessarily incomplete. Exogenous events that are not induced by either the government
or the operator can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ﬁnancial equilibrium of ﬁrms, and can be used
as an opportunity to redistribute rents. Typical examples would be an internal or external
macroeconomic shock, such as the devaluation in Argentina in 2001, or the one in Brazil in
1999. However, the high incidence of renegotiations, particularly in early stages, appears
to be beyond the expected or reasonable levels, and raises concerns about the validity of
the concession model in which renegotiations would not be taken into account. It might
induce excessive opportunistic behavior by the new operators, or by the government, in
detriment to the eﬃciency of the process and overall welfare.
Once an enterprise has been granted a concession in an infrastructure sector -and the
eventual bidding competitors are gone- that enterprise may correspondingly be able to take
actions that “hold up” the government, for example through insisting on renegotiating the
regulatory contract ex post, or through regulatory capture. The extensive informational
advantages that the enterprise possesses over the government (as well, likely, as over other
potential operators) and its perceived leverage vis ` a vis the government in a bilateral
negotiation is a powerful potential factor to seek renegotiation of the contract and secure
3Examples are the highway concession program in Mexico in the early 1990s, the water concession in
the provinces of Tucuman and Buenos Aires in Argentina, and in the city of Cochabamba in Bolivia, and
a number of BOT (build operate transfer) concessions in the water sector in Mexico. The incidence of
concessions abandoned and taken over by the government has been signiﬁcant in other countries outside
the Latin American and Caribbean region, such as in Indonesia, Thailand, China, in East Asia, and
there have been a few cases in Africa, in Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Gambia. Most of those
abandonments have been in the roads, water and sanitation and in the power sector. Overall, 3 to 4% of
concessions have been abandoned (see Harris (2003)).
3a better deal than the initial one. However, the eﬀectiveness of the regulatory framework
matters signiﬁcantly in limiting the incidence of renegotiation.
Moreover, it is not only the ﬁrm that may behave opportunistically. Quite often, the
necessary investments are of the “sunk” type and highly speciﬁc, that is, costs that cannot
easily be recouped or salvaged if the economic atmosphere deteriorates or if the operator
were to discontinue operations. This may also tempt governments to take regulatory
actions that expropriate the available quasi-rents once costs are sunk.
The procurement and regulation literature4 has been written for developed countries
in which the quality of institutions yields a level of enforcement of contracts so high that
renegotiations can be considered as secondary at least as a ﬁrst approximation. On the
contrary, for less developed countries (LDCs) it appears that renegotiation is an important
phenomenon calling for both theoretical and empirical analysis.
Imperfect enforcement leading to renegotiations is a major characteristic, which must
be understood to provide a useful theoretical framework for procurement policy and reg-
ulation in LDCs. This has been emphasized by the 2001 World Development Report
(World Bank (2001)), which stresses that “there is a growing consensus that regulation,
particularly in poor countries, must be designed with an appreciation of both information
asymmetries and diﬃculties of enforcement”.
The literature on regulation and procurement contracts has dealt with asymmetric in-
formation within the framework of mechanism design and complete contracts. Then, rene-
gotiation never happens. If the regulator cannot commit not to renegotiate (Dewatripont
(1986)) the optimal contract suﬀers from the ratchet eﬀect, but is still renegotiation-proof
(Hart and Tirole (1988), Laﬀont and Tirole (1990)). Indeed, optimal contracting commits
to ex post ineﬃciencies to mitigate the costs of information rents. Any limitation of com-
mitment yields potential renegotiation which can be anticipated in the initial contract;
then, the anticipated outcome of renegotiation can be embedded in the initial contract,
which becomes renegotiation-proof, so that no renegotiation occurs along the equilibrium
path. The analysis has been extended to cases where some contractual variables require
costly auditing (Baron and Besanko (1984), Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), Khalil (1992)).
Auditing of eﬀort levels or states of nature is incorporated into the contracts but does not
yield renegotiation.
When can we have actual renegotiations? One way is to postulate that initial contracts
are incomplete (Hart and Moore (1988), Green and Laﬀont (1992), Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (1994), Segal and Whinston (2002)). The reasons invoked for these contractual
incompletenesses are contractual transaction costs diﬃcult to pin down, bounded ratio-
nality of players, which are rarely explicitly modeled, or some imperfections of the judicial
4See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) for a synthesis.
4system, which are assumed in a rather ad hoc way.
Recently, Bondt (2002) constructed a moral hazard model with ex post penalties,
which may not be enforced because of side-contracting between judges and the contractual
party. Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite (2000) instead considered incomplete contracts so
that, ex post, judges who maximize social welfare may be willing to void some clauses and
this could lead to renegotiations. Laﬀont (2000) and Laﬀont and Meleu (2001) oﬀered
procurement and regulation models with adverse selection where imperfect enforcement
of penalties can be aﬀected by expenditures in enforcement very much in the black box
tradition of the Chicago school.5
The purpose of this paper is to extend the concession model to accommodate both
renegotiations due to unanticipated events and opportunistic behavior by the ﬁrms in
anticipated events, and then to explore its empirical relevance with a unique dataset on
concession contracts in Latin America. In Section 2 of this paper, we extend the theoretical
framework of Laﬀont (2000) to account for a maximal number of realistic characteristics
of concession contracts and their environment, among which the existence of a regulatory
body, the power of incentives, the existence of investment requirements, the source of
ﬁnancing, and some speciﬁc clauses like arbitration rules. We also introduce exogenous
shocks (for example aﬀecting cost or demand as the result of some external economic
shock), characteristics of the political cycle (shift in the degree of political capture) and
of the institutional environment (quality of the bureaucracy or of the legal framework).
We allow for the two main motivations of renegotiation: Incompleteness of contracts
calling for Pareto improving renegotiation and enforcement failures, which yield rent shift-
ing renegotiations. This provides us with a whole set of predictions for the probabilities of
renegotiation of concession contracts. The model we develop is a model of renegotiations
initiated by ﬁrms. Renegotiations initiated by governments raise technical issues, which
would need a more complex modeling and are left for another paper. In particular, in
a world where ﬁrms have private information, the anticipation of governments’ oppor-
tunistic behavior will lead to strategic behavior by ﬁrms which may want to hide their
information to protect their future rents, inducing a complex ratchet eﬀect.
Then, Section 3 examines a data set of concessions awarded in Latin America and
Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of transport and water, and
analyzes the renegotiation of these contracts. We perform a probit panel analysis using
proxies for the main theoretical variables. The empirical analysis provides a broad support
to the predictions derived from the model, the main results being the importance of
having a regulator in place to limit renegotiations, the fragility of price caps, the incentive
5The importance of enforcement of laws was stressed by the Chicago school (see Becker (1968), Stigler
(1970), Becker and Stigler (1974), Posner (1972) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a recent synthesis),
but has been little addressed by modern contract theory.
5eﬀect of investment requirements to limit renegotiations, the relevance of economic shocks
(more renegotiations during downturns) and political cycles (more renegotiations after
elections), as well as the importance of good institutions (bureaucracy, rule of law, control
of corruption) to reduce the incidence of renegotiations.




Consider the concession of a natural monopoly that, in addition to a necessary sunk
investment, or ﬁxed cost, F, which is common knowledge, has a variable cost function:
C =( β − e)q, (1)
where q is the production level, β is a cost parameter, which is private information of the








and e is a decision variable of the
ﬁrm (moral hazard) which decreases cost, but creates to the manager a disutility Ψ(e)
with Ψ  > 0, Ψ   > 0, Ψ    ≥ 0.
Consumers derive utility S (q), S  > 0, S   < 0 from the consumption of the natural
monopoly’s good. Let p(.) be the inverse demand function and ˆ t the transfer from the
regulator to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s net utility writes:
U = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F − Ψ(e). (2)
We assume that cost is ex post observable by the regulator as well as the price and the
quantity. So we can make the accounting assumption that revenues and cost are incurred
by the regulator, who pays a net transfer t = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F. Accordingly, the
participation constraint of the ﬁrm can be written:
U = t − Ψ(e)=t − Ψ(β − c) ≥ 0, (3)
where we make use of (1) to substitute e by β − c,w i t hc = C
q , and where the utility of
the outside opportunity has been normalized to zero for each type of ﬁrm.
To ﬁnance the transfer ˆ t, the government must raise taxes with a price of public funds
1+λ, λ>0. Hence, consumers’ net utility is:
V = S (q) − p(q)q − (1 + λ)ˆ t. (4)
6Utilitarian social welfare is then given by the sum of consumers’ surplus and the ﬁrm
utility, here with equal weight of 1 for both:
  W = U + V
= S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F +Ψ( e)) − λU. (5)
This implies that the government values the rent of the ﬁrm as much as consumers’
utility, which may not be realistic when the awarded concessionaire is a foreign ﬁrm. The
key feature, however, is that the regulator dislikes leaving a rent to the ﬁrm (−λU in (5)).
This occurs as long as the weight of the ﬁrm’s rent in social welfare is lower that 1 + λ.
In subsequent sections, we analyze the eﬀect of making this weight vary.













U =0 . (8)
We denote q∗,e ∗,U
∗ and q∗,e∗,U
∗
the complete information solutions corresponding
to β and β respectively.
Since consumers equate their marginal utility to the price (S  (q)=p), equation (6),
which says that social marginal utility equals social marginal cost, can be rewritten as a
Lerner index formula:








where η (p) is the price elasticity of demand. The price is then between the marginal cost




The marginal disutility of eﬀort Ψ  (e) is equated to its marginal social gain q (equation
(7)), and no rent is given up to the ﬁrm (equation (8)) because funds are socially costly
(λ>0).
Suppose now that the regulator cannot observe the eﬀort level e and does not know
β. However, he can oﬀer a contract to the ﬁrm before the latter discovers its type (see
Figure 1 for the timing).
6We make the appropriate assumptions on S (.) so that W is strictly concave in (q,e). For more details
















Equation (3) shows that the observability of cost reduces the problem to a simple
adverse selection problem. From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in







each message ˜ β = β or ˜ β = β an average cost to achieve and a net transfer from the
regulator. The regulatory contract also recommends a production level q (or q)a n da
total cost C (or C), compatible with c (or c) (between which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent).
However, the direct revelation mechanism must be truthful, i.e., must satisfy the
incentive constraints


















where U (resp. ¯ U) represents at a truthful equilibrium the rent of type β (resp. ¯ β).
These constraints can be rewritten:
U ≥ U +Φ( e) (11)
U ≥ U − Φ(e +∆ β), (12)
where Φ(e)=Ψ( e) − Ψ(e − ∆β),Φ  > 0, Φ   > 0.
Since the ﬁrm must accept or reject the contract before it knows its type, its partici-
pation constraint must be written ex ante:
νU +( 1− ν)U ≥ 0. (13)
Finally, the regulator’s maximization program becomes:
max











q − (1 + λ)
 








S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)
 






s.t. (11) (12) (13).
It is more transparent to rewrite this program in terms of the variables (q,e,U)r a t h e r
than (q,c,U). Let us also denote W (q,e,β) the complete information ex post social
8welfare for a production level q and an eﬀort level e when the eﬃciency parameter is β,
i.e.:
W (q,e,β)=S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F +Ψ( e)). (14)
The regulator’s program rewrites:
max

















s.t. (11) (12) (13).
The regulator makes the participation constraint binding and, substituting in the
objective function, maximizes social welfare7.F o re a c hv a l u eo fβ he ﬁnds the complete
information optimum. There are many pairs of transfers that structure the rents in such
a way that the incentive constraints are satisﬁed. The main point to notice is that the
ineﬃcient type ¯ β’s ex post utility is always negative.8
This negative ex post utility raises the issue of enforcement. Indeed, once it discovers
its type β the ﬁrm would like to renege on the regulatory contract. In a country with
strong institutions, the contract is enforced in both states of nature β and β.A s a
consequence, asymmetric information does not create any transaction cost for society and
the complete information optimal allocation is achieved despite the setting of incomplete
information.
At the other extreme, suppose that the regulator anticipates that he will not be able
to enforce a negative ex post utility level for the ﬁrm. Then, he will choose a regulatory
contract, which maximizes expected social welfare under the incentive constraints, but
also the ex post participation constraints:9
U ≥ 0 (15)
U ≥ 0. (16)
The set of constraints is the same as if the contract was oﬀered to the ﬁrm at the
interim stage, i.e. once the ﬁrm knows its type. We know that in this case the eﬃcient
type’s incentive constraint (11) and the ineﬃcient type’s participation constraint (16)
will be the binding ones. Substituting into the objective function of the regulator and
7See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
8This loss is minimized when (11) is binding.






























and the same pricing equations as under complete information10.
Now, the eﬃcient type captures a positive rent and, to decrease somewhat this socially
costly rent, the regulator decreases the eﬀort level in the case β = β, while the eﬃcient
type’s eﬀort level is not distorted.
2.2 Imperfect Enforcement
We want to model more precisely what happens when institutions ensure only an imperfect
enforcement of regulatory contracts.
We will assume that when the ﬁrm obtains an ex post utility lower than its status-quo
payoﬀ, it attempts to renegotiate its regulatory contract11. However, with a probability
π (x), the regulator is able nevertheless to impose the implementation of the agreed upon
contract. This probability depends on the expenses x incurred to ﬁnance the functioning
of the enforcement mechanism. We assume that π (0) = 0, limx→∞ π (x)=1 ,πx > 0,
πxx < 0.
With probability 1 − π (x) the regulator is forced to accept a renegotiation. This is
modeled using the Nash bargaining solution but assuming that renegotiation is costly
(become it takes time say). The status quo payoﬀs, which obtain if negotiation fails, are
determined as follows: the ﬁrm loses its ﬁxed cost and gets the utility level U0 = −F.
The regulator obtains a status quo payoﬀ that we denote as W0 = −H.
We make appropriate assumptions so that the eﬃcient type ﬁrm never wants to renege
on its contract12. Therefore, costly bargaining takes place under complete information,






































10This is due to the fact that the cost function satisﬁes the separability assumption C (q,h(β,e)) which
implies the dichotomy property, i.e. the absence of incentive correction in the pricing formula (see Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1993).
11More precisely, we assume that a ﬁrm attempts to renegotiate when its ex post utility level after
renegotiation is higher than the utility level speciﬁed in the contract. We are considering values of
parameters where it is better for the regulator to accept the possibility of renegotiation than to give up
such large rents in the initial contract so that no type of ﬁrm wants to renegotiate.
12See conditions below.
10with δ in (0,1) to model the cost of renegotiation.














i.e. the ﬁrm and the regulator share equally the social surplus.
Anticipating the outcome of the renegotiation, the regulator modiﬁes ex ante the
contract it oﬀers. From now on, we denote by U1 and U1 the modiﬁed rents once the
possibility of renegotiation is taken into account by the regulator.
The sequence of events is now the following. If the ﬁrm discovers to be a bad type
β, with probability π(x) it faces tough enforcement and carries out the project despite a
negative utility. With probability 1 − π(x), it succeeds in forcing a renegotiation. More-
over, when renegotiation happens, we assume that with some (small) positive probability
P the parties fail to reach an agreement and the status quo payoﬀs are implemented.











=( 1 − ν)(1− π (x))(1 − P)
Pr(U = −F)=( 1 − ν)(1− π (x))P.
We still need the oﬀer of contracts to be incentive compatible (conditions (11) and
(12)) and the new ex ante participation constraint writes13:
νU1 +( 1− ν)π(x)U1 +( 1− ν)(1 − π(x))(1 − P)U
E
−(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))PF ≥ 0. (22)




























+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))P [−H] − (1 + λ)x. (23)
13Note that the choice of the new levels of rent U1 and U1, which is not unique, must be made in
such a way that the eﬃcient type does not want to mimic the bad type and then renegotiate, i.e. s.t.
U1 ≥ π (x)
 
U1 +Φ ( e)
 






+( 1− π (x))P [−F]


























+ H + λF
 . (26)
The probability of renegotiation is given by:
Pr(renegotiation)=( 1− ν)(1 − π(x
E)) (27)
where, in the right hand side, the second term, which can be labeled as the government’s
“tolerance for renegotiation”, depends on xE, the investment in enforcement.
What are the main features of the solution above? First, an enforcement mechanism
is ﬁnanced. It is valuable to build an enforcement institution only because the social









), or because renegotiation may fail. This
enforcement mechanism is imperfect and its quality is determined by (26). The quality of
enforcement decreases (and therefore the probability of renegotiation increases) with the
eﬃciency of ex post bargaining δ.
Note that an increase in the cost of public funds has a diﬀerent eﬀect on social welfare
W(q∗,e∗,β) depending on the sign of revenue net of cost, i.e.,
p(q)q − ((β − e)q + F + ψ(e)).
It is increasing in λ if revenues exceed cost so that the industry is used as a source of
public funds. It is decreasing in λ in the other case. So the net eﬀect of an increase in
λ is to decrease enforcement in the second case, which holds in general for the water and
transportation industries14 that we are considering here.15
Second, the power of incentives is not intermediary between what is obtained with
perfect enforcement (high powered) and self-enforcing contracts (low powered). This is
because any rent resulting from ex post renegotiation is captured ex ante in the contract
oﬀered by the regulator.
14The eﬀect through PλF can be neglected for P small.
15In the absence of a proper measure of the cost of public funds, we will proxy it by the lack of
institutional quality (associated with a more ineﬃcient tax system).
122.3 Institutional constraints
Institutional constraints in host countries obviously aﬀect the incidence of renegotiation
in concession contracts. In what follows, we introduce in diﬀerent ways these institutional
dimensions in the regulatory contract, focusing speciﬁcally on politics, corruption and rule
of law.
2.3.1 Politics and State Capture
A simple way to model the incidence of political considerations in the occurrence of
renegotiations, is to assume that the government is more or less captured by the ﬁrm’s
stakeholders and overweights or underweights the ﬁrm’s utility in social welfare16.T h u s ,
the maximization program consists of a weighted sum of consumers’ surplus and the utility
of the ﬁrm:
W = V + γU,
where γ may actually be greater than 1. We simply need to assume, for an interior
solution to hold, that γ<1+λ, so that the regulator always wants to minimize and not
maximize the ﬁrm’s rent. A value of γ higher than 1 is thus the sign that the interests of
the ﬁrm and the government are more aligned, i.e. of a higher degree of state capture by
the ﬁrm’s stakeholders. A value of γ less than 1 is a sign that the government is partially
captured by the non-stakeholders of the ﬁrm.
Solving the same maximization problem as before, we get a value of U
E
deﬁned by
















+ H +( 1+λ − γ)F
 . (28)
What are the eﬀects of an increase in γ, i.e. of a higher degree of state capture on the
probability of renegotiation? From (28) it can be seen that it decreases the equilibrium
level of enforcement, which implies more renegotiation. When γ increases, the cost of
giving up a rent decreases. Suppose ﬁrst that renegotiation never fails (P = 0). Then this
lower cost of the rent has no eﬀect because ex ante contracting enables the regulator to
capture this rent. However, if, as we have assumed, politicians do not incur losses when
renegotiation fails, the level of capture does not aﬀect social welfare when renegotiation
fails. As γ increases, the cost of the rent (when there is no renegotiation or when rene-
gotiation succeeds) decreases. From the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, it implies that
16See Laﬀont (2000a).
13the social cost of losing the sunk cost F when renegotiation fails decreases as well. It
is relatively less costly to provoke renegotiation (because the regulator is relatively less
concerned by failure of negotiation) and therefore the level of enforcement decreases. In
a dynamic framework, changes of the majority may correspond to shifts in the value of γ.
Empirically, we would thus expect the probability of renegotiation to be aﬀected by the
results of recent elections. Additionally, we can also expect the existence of a regulator
at the time of signing the contract to result in better contracts that would limit the scope
for subsequent political capture.
2.3.2 Rule of Law or Corruption
We assume now that the probability of enforcing the agreed upon contract takes the form
θπ(x), where the parameter θ stands for the quality of the rule of law or for the level of
non-corruption, i.e. of the existing “stock” of institutions. This parameter θ may also
represent a more direct channel of political capture when regulators or politicians can be
bribed.















+ H + λF
 , (29)
so that better rule of law or less corruption implies more investment in enforcement.
The direct eﬀect of an increase in θ is thus to decrease the probability of renegotiation,
since it decreases the relative cost of enforcing the initial contract. Thus, we expect that
in environments characterized by better rule of law or less corruption there will be less
renegotiations.
2.4 Shocks
A simple way to introduce shocks in our framework is to suppose that the distribution of
ﬁrm’s types is subject to an unanticipated noise, so that upon a shock ε, the probabilities
of the enterprise being good or bad become {ν + ε,1 − ν − ε}. This can be thought of
as a shortcut to model a shock aﬀecting either cost or demand of a fraction of the ﬁrms
and to take into account Pareto improving renegotiations made possible by unanticipated
events.
The probability or renegotiation then becomes:
Pr(renegotiation)=( 1− ν − ε)(1− π(x
E)), (30)
14which decreases as ε increases. This means that positive shocks, such as an increase in
demand or a favorable shift in relative prices of inputs or outputs, reduce the probability
of renegotiation, while negative shocks (decrease in demand, cost shock) increase the
probability of renegotiation.17
2.5 Outside Financing and Limited Liability
Consider now the case where the ﬁrm is protected by limited liability. However, the ﬁrm
owns assets, which can be used as collateral if it incurs some debt. The sunk investment
has to be made before producing, and ﬁnancing may take two forms. First, the ﬁrm must
rely on bank ﬁnancing but should be guaranteed enough proﬁt to pay back the loan.18
Second, if private ﬁnancing is insuﬃcient, the government may ﬁnance it. Of course, any
combination of these two cases is also possible. Let us introduce the following notations:
A denotes the ﬁrm’s assets needed for the project.
F is the necessary additional sunk investment.
K is the amount ﬁnanced by banks’ loans (K ∈ [0,F]), so that K = 0 implies complete
government ﬁnancing, while K = F corresponds to totally private ﬁnancing. The interest
rate on this loan is r.
As the ﬁrm has to repay K, its utility level is now:
U = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − (1 + r)K − Ψ(e). (31)
Moreover, since the bank must be repaid, the ﬁrm must have a non negative utility:19
U ≥ 0.
This limited liability constraint ensures that the bank is always paid back. To simplify
the analysis, we thus consider that the regulator takes this constraint into account in his
program and does not include the bank’s welfare in social welfare. A further justiﬁcation
is that the bank may be a foreign bank with respect to which default is not aﬀordable.
Since the government ﬁnances only F −K, at the cost of public fund λ, the equivalent
of (14) becomes:
W (q,e,β)=S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F + rK +Ψ( e)). (32)
17Admittedly, this is a very particular way of extending the model to account for renegotiations due
to unexpected events.
18Here, we simplify the analysis by excluding renegotiations with the bank itself. It allows us to consider
the bank’s interest rate as exogenous.
19We could specify this limited liability constraint on ﬁnancial ﬂows ˆ t+p(q)q−(β−e)q−(1+r)K ≥ 0.
This would introduce more regimes to consider in the program of the regulator below.
15Note that the level of K will aﬀect the status quo payoﬀ of the government in case
of renegotiation. In what follows, we will assume that A<F, so that the ﬁrm is able to
repay only a share of its debt in case of failure20. Two subcases arise. If K<A , the bank
gets K and the government gets the remainder A − K that covers part of its investment
F − K, leaving a net loss F − A. The status quo payoﬀs of the ﬁrm and the government
are respectively:
(−A,−H − F + A).
If K>A , the bank gets only A while the government gets nothing, so it loses F −K.
Payoﬀs are then:
(−A,−H − F + K).
These two cases can be summarized, by noting that the status quo payoﬀs are:
(−A,−H − F +m a x ( K,A)). (33)
With the possibility of renegotiation and the disagreement point now given by (33),








+ H + F − max(K,A) − λA
2λ
. (34)
So, private ﬁnancing costs more than public ﬁnancing, but it increases the status quo
payoﬀ of the regulator and therefore its bargaining power in the renegotiation. Accord-
ingly, the outcome of renegotiation for the ﬁrm decreases with K. Similarly it decreases
(resp. increases) with F if δ(1 + λ) > 1 (resp. δ(1 + λ) < 1). Note that the outcome of
renegotiation for the regulator unambiguously decreases with F.
The program becomes then:
max



























+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))P [−H − F +m a x ( K,A)] − (1 + λ)x (35)
20Were we to consider the case A>F, the ﬁrm’s assets would cover the total losses in case of renego-
tiation failure. The bank would get K and the government F − K,and the status quo payoﬀs would be
(−F,−H), thus being independent of ﬁnancing.
16s.t.
νU1 +( 1− ν)π(x)U1
+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))(1 − P)U
E
−(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))PA ≥ 0 (36)
U1 ≥ U1 +Φ( e) (37)
U1 ≥ U1 − Φ(e − ∆β) (38)
U1 ≥ 0 (39)
U1 ≥ 0. (40)
The binding constraints are the limited liability constraint of the bad type (40) and
either the incentive constraint of the good type (37) or the participation constraint (36).
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Noticing that now renegotiation happens only if U
E
≥ 0, and assuming that P is
small, the second term in parenthesis is negative, so only the incentive constraint (37) is
binding (U1 =Φ( e)). Substituting the values of U1,U1 and U
E
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+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))P [−H − F +m a x ( K,A)] − (1 + λ)x. (41)
The eﬀort and output levels of the bad type are now distorted because an expected
rent is given up to the ﬁrm:
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The presence of the term π
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at the denominator implies a stronger distortion than













17What is the eﬀect of variations in F and K on the probability of renegotiation? From









This ﬁrst eﬀect is due to the combined eﬀect that an increase of K increases cost (and
therefore decreases the gain from avoiding renegotiation) and improves the regulator’s





This second eﬀect is also due to the fact that an increase F increases cost.22 Although
it also decreases the bargaining power of the regulator, this cost eﬀect dominates.23
There is, however, an incentive eﬀect of the limited liability constraint. Indeed, the
expected utility of the ﬁrm is now strictly positive. Therefore, it has incentives to invest
to increase its expected proﬁt. Suppose that with expenses i(ν)( i  (ν) > 0,i    (ν) ≥ 0)
the ﬁrm increases the probability that β = β. The ﬁrm chooses its investment level by
solving:
max











Assuming for simplicity that it does not take into account the impact of its choice on









This means that everything that decreases (resp. increases) the ﬁrm’s bargaining
power and therefore the utility from renegotiation increases (resp. decreases) its incentive
for investment and therefore decreases (resp. increases) the probability of renegotiation.
From the expression of U
E
we see that, through this eﬀect, if F increases, either the
probability of renegotiation increases (case δ(1+λ) < 1) which reinforces the direct eﬀect,
21Note that if renegotiation was involving the bank it would remain true that an increase of K which
weakens the bank’s position should improve the bargaining power of the regulator.





. This reinforces the eﬀect on x.
23This is true whenever −(1 + λ)
 




2 (−δ(1 + λ)+1 )< 0. This can be rewritten
(1 + λ)(1 + δP) > 1+P
2 , which is always veriﬁed.
18or it decreases (case δ(1 + λ) > 1). On the other hand, an increase in K decreases the
probability of renegotiation.
Overall, more investment unambiguously increases the probability of renegotiation if
δ(1 + λ) < 1 and has an ambiguous eﬀect otherwise. More private ﬁnancing always has
an ambiguous eﬀect.
2.6 Regulation, Arbitration and other Contractual Clauses
Concession contracts sometimes contain speciﬁc clauses meant to deal with the potential
occurrence of renegotiations, as for example the existence of a formal set of arbitration
rules in case of disputes, and minimum income guarantees.
Arbitration rules are processes which help settle disputes, thereby making renegoti-
ation less costly, i.e. increase δ. W eh a v es e e nt h a tai n c r e a s ei nδ decreases xE and
increases the probability of renegotiation. In this case, we would thus expect the exis-
tence of formal arbitration rules (higher δ) to increase the probability of renegotiation.
On the other hand, the existence of a regulatory body or more experience in concession
contracting at the time of award will decrease the probability of renegotiation due to the
more obvious eﬀect of greater expertise in contracting.
A minimum income guarantee should decrease the desirability of renegotiation by
ﬁrms but it also decreases the incentives for eﬀort. However, as discussed above, clauses
of the concession aﬀecting the outcome of a potential renegotiation should be treated as
endogenous. This endogeneity has two dimensions. First there is a direct self-selection
eﬀect. For example, minimum income guarantee clauses are more likely to be introduced
in more risky projects. Second, the inclusion of such clauses has a moral hazard eﬀect, in
that it may aﬀect the incentive of the ﬁrm to behave eﬃciently as explained above. This
implies a countervailing eﬀect on the probability of renegotiation. Ultimately, determining
the qualitative impact of such rules requires to take into account both eﬀects, and is an
empirical matter.
As for the strength of incentives, it is clear from (42) and (43) that it is determined
simultaneously with the level of enforcement. From (43), the higher incentives, the higher
the probability of renegotiation. However, to fully appreciate the impact of the strength
of incentives on renegotiation one must take into account that a regulatory mechanism is
chosen for several periods. A high powered mechanism such as price cap will create more
risky revenues in the future and obviously increase the probability of renegotiation. But




We use an original data set, developed by the World Bank, which describes the charac-
teristics of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin American and Caribbean countries
from 1982 to 2000, in the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport and water.
We restrict ourselves to the sectors of transport and water because these are concessions
stricto sensu, as opposed to telecommunications and energy projects, which in most cases
are privatizations with sales of assets.24
We say that a concession contract is renegotiated when a major revision, not envi-
sioned in the original contract, takes place. For example signiﬁcant changes in tariﬀs or
investments, in the annual fees paid by the operator to the government, in the number
of cost components with automatic pass through to tariﬀ adjustments or in the length
of the concession. Thus, scheduled ordinary and extraordinary tariﬀ revisions or minor
adjustments to the contract are not considered to be a renegotiation. Yet, it should be
recognized that there is some element of subjectivity in deﬁning those triggers.
Calls for renegotiations are led by the government, the operator or by both. In the
database, only when it was clear to both parties who was the originator of the renegotiation
did we use that information. For all other cases we classify the renegotiation as led by
both parties jointly. An example is the highway concession program in Mexico. Many
of those concessions went bankrupt for a number of reasons, but the high devaluation
in 1994 did play a role. There were a number of traﬃc guarantees and loans from the
formerly state owned ﬁnancial sector. The ensuing bailout or government take-over was
broadly the result of a sort of joint call; renegotiations were thus classiﬁed as such.
Considering only concessions for which we know whether they were renegotiated or
not as of 2000, and at what date this renegotiation took place, and restricting to the
5 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) where concessions were
granted on a regular basis through the 1990s in theses two sectors, we get a sample of 307
concessions. Table 1 shows the distribution by countries, sectors, and sub-sectors.
24See Guasch (2001) for a detailed description of the data.
20The database contains detailed information about the characteristics of these conces-
sions, including general details about the projects (sector of activity, year of award), the
award process, investment and ﬁnancing, the duration of the concession, information with
respect to the institutional context and the regulator, the type of regulatory framework
put in place (price cap or rate of return), and other details of the concession contract like
arbitration clauses and income guarantees, among others. Table 2 presents the full list
and deﬁnitions of variables used in the analysis below, as well as the frequency distribu-
tion of dummy variables, and the mean and standard deviation of continuous variables
when relevant.
21Table 3 summarizes the sector frequency of the concessions’ key characteristics, which
are represented through dummy variables.
22The time structure of the sample is also important. Table 4 presents the number of
outstanding concessions by country, from 1989 to 2000, and table 5 shows the occurrence of
renegotiations in each country and year, giving ﬁrst the number of renegotiations initiated
by ﬁrms, and second the total number of renegotiations regardless of their initiator. In
total, 162 of the 307 concessions were renegotiated at some point during the time period
under consideration, the bulk of renegotiations taking place in four countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Moreover a look at table 5 reveals the apparent importance
of economic ﬂuctuations and political shocks in determining renegotiations. Indeed, the
main peaks coincided with clearly identiﬁed events: in Argentina in 1990 (hyperinﬂation
and recession), in Brazil in 1999 (devaluation of the real), in Colombia in 2000 (recession)
and in Mexico around 1995 (Mexican crisis). Although not all shocks have triggered
waves of renegotiations, these facts suggest the consideration of economic and political
ﬂuctuations as potential determinants of renegotiations.
As for renegotiations initiated by ﬁrms, they amount to 53, of which 49 in the transport
sector (12 in railroad, 33 in roads and 4 in port projects) and only 4 in water (2 in potable
water, 2 in sewerage projects). Moreover, they concentrate in Argentine and Colombia,
while in Brazil and Mexico renegotiations were almost always initiated by the government
23or both. In this paper, we mostly focus on these ﬁrm-led renegotiations and, as said before,
we leave for another paper the analysis of government-led renegotiations.25
We build a panel sample by introducing in any given year macroeconomic variables
(GDP growth and real exchange rate appreciation) and a political dummy variable indi-
cating the occurrence of national elections (presidential or legislative). Lastly, to capture
the inﬂuence of the broad institutional context, we introduce indices of corruption, rule of
law and bureaucratic quality. We get an unbalanced rotating panel of 1267 observations,
covering 12 years and 307 concessions.
3.2 Probit Analysis




int = xiα1 + α2zint + Entα3 + eint < 0], (44)
where 1 is the indicator function taking value 1 whenever the statement in brackets
is true, and 0 otherwise; yint is the binary variable indicating whether concession i,i n
country n,a tt i m et, is renegotiated or not at the initiative of the ﬁrm; xi is a vector
of time invariant characteristics of the concession contracts; zint is the time elapsed, in
years, since the award of concession i, in country n; Ent is a vector of environmental
characteristics like economic shocks, elections and institutional indices; eint is the error
term; and α1, α2,a n dα3 are the vectors of parameters corresponding to xi, zint,a n dEnt
respectively.
Table 6 details the correspondence between the key variables highlighted in the model
and the proxies included in the empirical model that determine the latent variable in
brackets in equation (44).
The probit model, using the panel described above, allows us to take into account the
speciﬁc characteristics of each individual concession contract, as well as aspects of the
environment that evolve over time. The output of these estimations is in Tables 7 to 10.
25In the ﬁnal section, we perform some robustness checks using as dependent variable the renegotiations
initiated by the ﬁrm or by both.
243.3 Results
The upper panel of Table 7 shows the results for our basic speciﬁcation, including the
characteristics of the contracts, the regulatory and institutional environment, a sector
dummy, political and economic shocks as well as the duration since award of the conces-
sion to account for the dynamics of the contract. Column 1 presents the “reduced form”
equation, including only truly exogenous variables. The existence of a regulator has a
signiﬁcant and negative impact on the probability of renegotiation, as does better institu-
tional quality, here represented by an index of bureaucratic quality. Older contracts prove
more fragile. Finally, shocks represented by ﬂuctuations in the macroeconomic growth
25rate signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of renegotiation, i.e. recessions increase it while
booms reduce it, and this probability also goes up in years following national elections.
In columns 2 to 5, we add to this basic speciﬁcation a number of other variables.
Concessions regulated by price caps consistently prove more fragile. Both the existence of
investment requirements and the exclusivity of private ﬁnancing increase the occurrence
of renegotiations. In column 3, the existence of an arbitration process is not signiﬁcant,
and in column 4, an index of corruption shows that a more corrupt environment increases
renegotiations.26 Not surprisingly, in this case the bureaucratic quality index loses signif-
icance. Finally, in column 5, exchange rate movements replace growth ﬂuctuations; the
results are unchanged, with lagged measures of exchange rate depreciation signiﬁcantly
increasing the probability of renegotiations by ﬁrms.
The lower panel of Table 7 shows the marginal eﬀects associated with the coeﬃcients
discussed above. Overall, the most signiﬁcant feature of the environment having an impact
on the probability of renegotiation is the existence of a regulatory body at the time the
concession was awarded. This aspect signiﬁcantly reduces the occurrence of subsequent
renegotiations, remains unaltered when controlling for the whole range of characteristics
and shocks, and is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Compared to a situation
where no regulator is around when the concession contract is signed, the presence of such
a regulator consistently implies a reduction in the probability of renegotiation of between
5 and 7,3%. This value is particularly large, considering that the average probability of
renegotiation of any individual contract at any point in time is around 1%.27
The pre-existence of a regulator in the ﬁeld where a concession is awarded can ﬁrst be
related to the simple fact that a regulation better designed from the start will reduce the
scope for obvious mistakes and lessen the need for later disruptive modiﬁcations. Instead,
it can be expected that contingencies occurring during the life of the project could be
dealt with through a normal revision process inside the existing regulatory framework.
Furthermore, the pre-existence of a regulator increases the quality of enforcement by
better commitment.
Moreover, this aspect can be related to the deeper issue of contract incompleteness.
It is sometimes argued that concession contracts should be made as complete as possi-
ble, i.e. trying to include every possible contingency to avoid leaving room for ex post
renegotiations.28 However, there are limits to this approach. First, in a very complex
26This corresponds to a negative sign of the coeﬃcient, due to the fact that a higher value of the index
means less corruption (see Table 2 above).
27Marginal eﬀects for individual variables may more than oﬀset the average probability of renegotiation.
This stems from the fact that marginal eﬀects are computed by making one variable vary (by one unit
if continuous, from 0 to 1 if binary) while maintaining all other variables equal to the sample mean.
Correlations between variables may then generate the observed eﬀect in probabilities.
28See the example of the Buenos Aires water concession, running hundreds of pages and several volumes,
26world describing inﬁnite contingencies is just impossible and so contracts are bound to
be incomplete. Second, imperfect enforcement limits the eﬀectiveness of these contracts.
Finally, complex contracts might be counter-productive if they lack transparency, contain
contradictory requirements and lend themselves to opportunistic revision claims. These
problems favor an alternative approach, which relies on short concession-speciﬁc docu-
ments, while general rules regarding concessions would be found in laws and the relevant
jurisprudence. With this type of contract, previous experience in dealing with the design
of concessions should have an important role in limiting the risk of later renegotiations,
and this is precisely what we should expect from a specialized and experienced regulator.
The impact of the diﬀerent regulatory schemes on the probability of renegotiation
can be observed through the price cap variable, which shows up positive and signiﬁcant
in almost all the speciﬁcations tested. Thus, price cap schemes are conducive to more
renegotiations. This eﬀect is likely to be due to their greater riskiness and fragility to
shocks. As for their marginal eﬀect, it appears to be around 1%, lower than the eﬀect
of having a regulator but still important. This is an important result calling for more
research on this issue, especially since price cap regulation has been used in 75% of the
concessions in Latin America, and the region is characterized by a rather volatile economic
environment.
The marginal eﬀect for the duration since award indicates that each additional year
increases the probability of renegotiation by 0.3 to 0.6%.
If, on top of basic performance requirements (service and quality) and price regulation,
concession contracts include investment requirements, they may end up being more sen-
sitive to ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm’s productivity, shocks and wrong demand forecasts.29 This
may explain the positive eﬀect of the investment variable in Table 7. As for the marginal
eﬀects, it ranges between 0.9 and 1.3%. Exclusive private ﬁnancing also proves to increase
the occurrence of renegotiation, although the results are less robust. In columns 2 and
5, where the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant, the marginal eﬀect ranges from 1.2 to
1.7%.
Institutional characteristics, as captured by indices of bureaucratic quality or corrup-
tion, have both a statistically and economically signiﬁcant impact on the probability of
renegotiation. An increase in one point in the ICRG index used implies an increase in
the probability of renegotiation of between 1 and 2%. To illustrate this in our sample,
going from the 1998 level of bureaucratic quality of Brazil or Colombia to that of Chile
mentioned in Klein (1998).
29In the transport sector, Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001) mention demand forecasts for the Wash-
ington D.C. Dulles Airport-Leesburg, Va. toll road, which were overestimated more than fourfold by
two consulting companies. Argentine’s freight railways concession included investment requirements that
proved excessive in view of the ulterior market development (Klein, 1998). Chilean tolled roads experi-
enced huge demand ﬂuctuations during the 1986-1995 period (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2000).
27or Mexico would reduce the probability of renegotiation of an individual contract at any
point in time by as much as 4%.
Political cycles are likely to have consequences on the occurrence of renegotiation.
As our theoretical model suggests, the government’s willingness to accept renegotiation
of concession contracts might depend crucially on the extent to which its interests are
aligned with those of the ﬁrm. Our empirical analysis shows that in years following
national elections, the probability of renegotiation increases by about 1% even when
controlling for the economic cycle. This is a ﬁrst indication of the importance of political
considerations. A more detailed analysis of this aspect would need to consider the nature
of political changes. In particular, asymmetries might appear depending on whether the
previous government cares more or less for the rents of the ﬁrm than its successor (see
Aubert and Laﬀont (2002)). Finally, interactions between the nature of government and
institutional characteristics like corruption might also be relevant.
Finally, the eﬀect of economic shocks is as expected and appears to complement rather
than substitute for that of contract characteristics discussed before. Fluctuations in the
macroeconomic growth rate signiﬁcantly aﬀect the occurrence of renegotiations, i.e. re-
cessions increase it while booms reduce it. A decrease of one point in the growth rate in
any given year increases the probability of renegotiation by 0.2% in the subsequent year
and by 0.4% two years later. As for the exchange rate, a 10% depreciation in any given
year increases the probability of renegotiation by 0.4% in the subsequent year and by 1.4%
two years later. Macroeconomic shocks can be thought of as exerting a negative eﬀect
on real income of the population (both through inﬂation and prices of imported goods in
the case of exchange rate depreciation), which in turn depresses the demand for infras-
tructure services. Additionally, exchange rate depreciation may aﬀect the proﬁtability of
concession holders by increasing the cost of capital.
The contract characteristics introduced in columns 2 to 5 (price cap, investment re-
quirements, the structure of ﬁnancing, arbitration process) refer to clauses in the conces-
sion contract which are likely to be introduced or not according to the risk of renegotiation
perceived ex ante, and are thus endogenous to the type and the riskiness of the projects
undertaken. This highlights the need to address the broader issue of contract endogeneity.
3.4 Addressing Contract Endogeneity
The endogeneity of contracts’ clauses has two dimensions. First, there is an ex ante
self-selection problem, in that the contracting parties would select speciﬁc clauses, type of
regulation, extent of investment requirements and ﬁnancing according to their (sometimes
unobservable) characteristics. For example, the inclusion of speciﬁc arbitrage rules could
28be induced by the government’s anticipation of potential renegotiations and of the ﬁrm’s
perceived renegotiation skills. Conversely, minimum income guarantee would be included
as a mean to make risky concessions attractive to private agents. A similar problem
applies to the type of tariﬀ regulation chosen. A self-selection eﬀect would suggest that
more eﬃcient ﬁrms would prefer price cap regulation, which is more risky but would allow
these ﬁrms to get higher rents, but may also lead to think that riskier projects would be
regulated by lower-powered (cost plus) schemes. Finally, the size of investment and type
of ﬁnancing that prevails cannot be considered as exogenous either, since private operators
would be more willing to ﬁnance projects appearing as less risky and/or more proﬁtable.
Second, there is an ex post moral hazard problem (the eﬀect on the ν variable in
our model), due to the fact that once the contract has been signed, the ﬁrm and the
government would act strategically given the nature of this contract. Facing shorter
contracts, ﬁrms might be induced to behave more eﬃciently to increase their chance to
be awarded the contract again later on. Conversely, when protected by minimum income
guarantee, they might make less eﬀort. Price caps or private ﬁnancing can also be expected
to have incentive eﬀects on the behavior of ﬁrms.
The problem we intend to tackle is to assess the real incentive eﬀect of each speciﬁc
aspect of the contract. We use a two-stage process to instrument each of the variables
suspected to be endogenous. To do this, we need to ﬁnd suitable instruments. We take
as instruments: sectors, corruption, bureaucracy quality, rule of law, and existence of
regulatory body, which are obviously exogenous in the sense that they are not determined
by the risk of potential renegotiations. Nevertheless, ﬁnding instrumental variables that
would not enter the equation explaining the probability of renegotiation appears very
diﬃcult30: virtually any contract characteristics and any aspects of the institutional and
macroeconomic environment can be argued to have an impact on the probability of rene-
gotiation.
We run probit estimates of the variables we want to instrument, using the static
sample of the 307 concessions. Note that these ﬁrst stage estimations are fairly satisfac-
tory (see columns 1 to 4 in Appendix 1). We test for exogeneity of the variables under
scrutiny, using the Rivers-Vuong (1988) approach, which simply consists in running the
standard probit estimation augmented by the residuals of the ﬁrst stage estimations (see
also Wooldridge, 2002). Exogeneity is rejected for the price cap, the investment and the
arbitration variables, while the test fails to reject it for the private ﬁnancing variable. The
p-values for the Rivers-Vuong test are in the last row of the table in Appendix 1.
We then take the predicted values of each of the variables found to be endogenous
30Although the existence of one of these variable not entering the equation explaining renegotiation is
doubtful, identiﬁcation is still ensured by the non-linearity of the model.
29and reintroduce them in the probit panel. Finally, we estimate the equations with these
instrumented variables.31 Furthermore, as we perform the two stages separately, we need
to adjust the standard errors of the second stage. As computing the covariance matrix
for a panel with several endogenous variables is not tractable, we present bootstrapped
standard errors for the IV estimations. The results are in Table 8.
The price cap variable remains positive and signiﬁcant once instrumented. Thus,
despite the potential self-selection eﬀect, the higher riskiness of price caps still leads to
more renegotiation of the concessions under this regulatory scheme.32
The most striking diﬀerence with the previous table is the negative and signiﬁcant sign
of the investment requirements variable when instrumented. This seems to conﬁrm that
the incentive eﬀects of the limited liability constraint more than compensate the direct
cost eﬀect (see section 2.5). In other words, the existence of investment requirements,
because it decreases the ﬁrm’s status quo payoﬀ and thus its utility from renegotiation,
induces the ﬁrm to behave more eﬃciently. This eﬀect appears to outweigh the adverse
eﬀect on the cost that decreases the gain for the government to avoid renegotiating, so
that the ﬁnal probability of renegotiation is reduced. Finally, once the investment variable
is instrumented, the prevalence of private ﬁnance loses signiﬁcance, although it remains
positive.
One aspect worth noticing is that the existence of a regulator loses signiﬁcance when
some contract clauses are instrumented. Technically, this may be related to the fact
that this variable is used both in the instrumental ﬁrst stage estimations and in the
ﬁnal speciﬁcation. Intuitively, this could indicate that the inﬂuence of regulatory bodies
precisely goes through their ability in selecting speciﬁc clauses adapted to the type and
circumstances of the concessions.
The remaining results remain unaﬀected. The arbitration process variable is still
positive but not signiﬁcant, while the duration since award, bureaucratic quality, the
lagged election and growth variables are all signiﬁcant and with the same sign than in
Table 7, with the election variable being more consistently signiﬁcant.
31In a simple probit model with an endogenous binary variable, a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) would prove more eﬃcient (see Wooldridge 2002). However, we are dealing with panel data and
several endogenous variables, which makes this approach too diﬃcult to apply. Support for the two-stage
strategy we adopt can be found in Angrist (1991), who argues based on a Monte Carlo study of a bivariate
probit model that in general IV estimates do not perform appreciably worse than estimates computed
using the correct likelihood function.
32It must be noted however that since the instrumented variables are dummy variables varying in the
range [0,1], their predicted values cover a reduced range. This induces a scale eﬀect that explains the
observed increases in the coeﬃcients’ sizes and does not allow for clear inferences on the magnitude of
the eﬀects. For example, the predicted value corresponding to the price cap variable has a mean very
close to the actual variable (0.92 compared to 0.94) but varies only in the range [0.52,1]. For this reason,
in what follows we only interpret marginal eﬀects when no instruments are used.
303.5 Robustness Checks
Tables 9 and 10 present various robustness checks.
In Table 9, we introduce additional variables, not explicitly considered in our theo-
retical model, that could potentially aﬀect the probability of renegotiation and alter the
signiﬁcance of our core variables. These are minimum income guarantee clauses, the ex-
istence of a bidding process previous to the award of the contract, and the duration of
contract.
Minimum income guarantee is introduced in columns 1 to 3. In column 1, the coeﬃ-
cient is positive but not signiﬁcant. Since exogeneity for this variable is rejected by the
Rivers-Vuong test (Appendix 1, column 5), we instrument it in columns 2 and 3. When
instrumented alone, it shows up positive and strongly signiﬁcant, but this eﬀect is again
lost when price cap and investment requirements are instrumented simultaneously. At
the very least, it means that this clause fails to reduce the incidence of renegotiation, and
there is some evidence that it actually increases it, which conﬁrms its inappropriateness
(see for example Engel et alii, 2000). While minimum income guarantees do in principle
protect holders of concession contract against shocks and other unforeseen contingencies,
we thus conclude they might instead increase the probability of renegotiation by reduc-
ing incentives to behave eﬃciently and/or fostering strategic underbidding, as well as by
making possible the realization of projects with negative social value.
In columns 4 and 5, the existence of a bidding process to award the concession is
negative but not signiﬁcant. This probably reﬂects the fact that bidding induces several
potentially opposed eﬀects: on the one hand, by allowing the selection of a more eﬃcient
operator, it should make the concession more robust; on the other hand, however, by
reducing its prospective proﬁts by this ex ante competition, it could also make it more
sensitive to shocks. Finally, strategic bidding behavior can also generate an increase in
subsequent renegotiations.
In columns 6 and 7, the duration of contracts is also negative but not statistically
signiﬁcant. More interestingly, Table 9 shows that our previous results with respect to
price caps, investment, institutional quality and shocks, are robust to the introduction
of these three variables, which advocates in favor of our basic theoretical speciﬁcation.
As for the marginal eﬀects in columns 1, 4 and 6, there are basically unchanged, with
average values around -5% for the existence of a regulator, 1% for the existence of a price
cap scheme, 0.5% for one additional year since award, -1% for a one point increase in the
index of bureaucratic quality and 1%, 0.2% to 0.4% respectively for elections and lagged
growth shocks.
Table 10 oﬀers some more robustness checks. Since our model is one of renegotiations
31initiated by ﬁrms, we started by using ﬁrm-led renegotiations as our dependent variable.
However, the fact that a renegotiation is proﬁtable to the ﬁrm does not exclude the
government from gaining too. This suggests using as a dependent variable the sum of
renegotiations initiated by ﬁrms and those initiated by both parties.33 The results in
columns 1 and 2 again show that our central results remain robust in that case. It can
be noticed that private ﬁnancing becomes negative, although not signiﬁcantly so, and
that the signiﬁcance of the lagged election variable is somewhat stronger. This could be
a preliminary indication that political cycle are specially relevant for the renegotiations
initiated or co-initiated by the government, but we leave a more precise analysis of this
issue for a future paper on government led renegotiations. Marginal eﬀects in column 1
are also larger than our base values from Table 8, but technically this is due to the fact
that we consider more renegotiations (68 instead of 53), which shows up in the higher
overall probability of renegotiation (2.4%).
In columns 3 and 4, we run estimations excluding from the sample the two countries,
Brazil and Chile, in which they were no or few ﬁrm-led renegotiations. The general
results are again robust. The marginal eﬀects for the existence of a regulator in column
3 is now 13.1%, which again is probably a technical eﬀect related to the reduced sample
(222 concessions instead of 307, leading to 908 panel observations instead of 1132).
In columns 5 and 6, we exclude institutional variables and include instead a full set of
country dummies. The main results remain unchanged, except the election variable that
becomes not signiﬁcant. The speciﬁc country dummies are very strongly signiﬁcant, but
this is not at the expense of the contract characteristics and the shocks, which are still
statistically signiﬁcant. As might be expected, in column 5 the marginal eﬀects of most
contract and environment variables are reduced, especially so for the election and growth
shocks variables.
Finally in columns 7 and 8, we run our basic estimation with a dummy variable for the
projects in the road sector, as concessions in this sub-sector seem to have been particularly
prone to renegotiation (33 out of the 53 concessionaire-led renegotiations). Once more, the
general results are robust, and the marginal eﬀects in column 7 are in line with the base
values from Table 7. The private ﬁnancing variable is however positive and signiﬁcant in
both estimations, indicating that this dimension might be of more speciﬁc importance for
other sectors.
33Also, as discussed above, renegotiations initiated by the ﬁrm may have been classiﬁed as initiated by
both parties when there was not full clarity about the initiator.
323.6 Relation to Theoretical Results
The empirical results presented above are broadly consistent with our theoretical model.
We had ﬁrst the prediction that better institutional quality (through our θ variable rep-
resenting rule of law, non-corruption, or the quality of bureaucracy) should imply less
renegotiations. This is indeed the case as the coeﬃcients of the institutional variables are
generally negative and signiﬁcant. We also expected a higher cost of public fund (proxied
by a lower eﬃciency of the bureaucracy) to raise the incidence of renegotiation, and this
is again conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis.
Political cycles have a positive eﬀect, in that post-election years witness more renego-
tiations. This result can be related to the eﬀect of the degree of state capture γ. Under
this approach, it means that, as governments closer to the ﬁrms access to power, they are
likely to tolerate more renegotiations.
Other results that we related to the degree of state capture γ, are corruption, with
higher levels of corruption corresponding to more capture, and the existence of a regulator,
expected to limit the potential for political capture. Again, in both cases the probit
analysis yielded the expected sign and results were signiﬁcant.
As anticipated, shocks have the expected eﬀect and are signiﬁcant determinants of the
probability of renegotiation.
Relating the existence of arbitration rules to the cost of bargaining, the empirical
results are consistent with our model, in that these rules increase the occurrence of rene-
gotiation, although the coeﬃcient are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, we have several variables for which the theoretical eﬀect was ambiguous. For
the price cap variable, the strong positive eﬀect found shows that the riskiness and the
fragility to shocks indeed dominates, which conﬁrms the direct eﬀect apparent in the
model. Investment, on the other hand, appears to generate a strong incentive eﬀect that
reduces the probability of renegotiation. Finally, private ﬁnancing appears to have a
positive impact on the probability of renegotiation, although only weakly robustly so.
4 Conclusion: Policy Implications
There are a number of clear policy implications for the design of concession contracts,
regulation and regulatory institutions aimed at facilitating the enforcement of those con-
tracts, coming out from the results reported in this paper.
The ﬁrst and perhaps foremost policy implication is about the relevance of regulation
and institutions: having regulatory institutions from the start and as autonomous as pos-
33sible matters. The ﬁndings reported in the paper argue for the key role of regulation and
proper associated institutions as a signal and proxy for the quality of enforcement and as
a ﬁlter and deterrent for costly opportunistic renegotiations. As it was shown, the exis-
tence of a regulatory body at the time the concession was awarded signiﬁcantly reduces
the occurrence of subsequent renegotiations. Overall, this result argues for the need to
have a regulatory agency in place prior to the granting of any concession in the sector,
which often was not the case in Latin American countries. There was a general or perhaps
self-serving presumption that for the time being a contract was suﬃcient and the agency
would be developed later, if at all. That has been shown to be very damaging. Addi-
tionally, granting a signiﬁcant degree of operational and ﬁnancial autonomy to regulatory
institutions should be favored. That measure and others that reduce the probability of
renegotiation through improving the governance environment, increasing predictability,
reducing arbitrariness and reducing corruption in regulatory decisions, should be consid-
ered.
The second key policy implication is in regard to the choice of the regulatory regime,
arguing that rate of return regulation should be reconsidered as the salient choice.L a t i n
American countries adopted the price caps regime with a vengeance. Price caps, under
a fairly volatile economic environment, regulate over 75% of the concessions.34 Unfortu-
nately, it appears that those countries merely swallowed rather than digested the concept,
not anticipating its full range of implications. In particular they failed to account for the
fact that price caps would increase the cost of capital. Moreover, the interaction of price
caps and an increased cost of capital in high risk, weak governance environments had deep
implications on the incidence of renegotiation. Price caps’ greater riskiness and fragility
to shocks led to more renegotiations as shown in this paper. Contracts were renegotiated
very quickly, about two years on average, after the award of the concession (Guasch, 2001).
Thus, there was little risk bearing for ﬁrms. They kept the eﬃciency gains when business
was good and renegotiated when it was poor. In many instances, these renegotiations
were aimed at increasing the rate of return to keep it consistent with the higher cost of
capital.
Weak regulatory capacity and weak eﬀective government commitment led to the fact
that price caps alone did not yield the expected beneﬁts for the users of the services. While
price caps did provide incentives for operators to quickly secure eﬃciency gains, many of
these gains were then captured by the governments or ﬁrms rather than shared with users.
Moreover, these were in fact penalized twice, since the eﬃciency gains came at the cost of a
higher cost of capital and thus higher tariﬀs to cover that increase. Finally, compounding
the pain inﬂicted on the users is the fact that the adoption of price cap regime tended to
delay or bring down investment levels, directly or through renegotiations, as ﬁrms did not
34Including all Latin American countries. This ﬁgure goes up to over 90% in our empirical sub-sample.
34get immediate rewards from those investments through tariﬀ adjustments: the existing
tariﬀs already accounted for expected investments or tariﬀs would be adjusted but only
at the next tariﬀ review period, usually a few years down the road.
Thus, not surprisingly, slowing down investment, reducing service obligations or in-
creasing direct or indirect subsidies were part of the renegotiation outcomes (Guasch
2001). Ultimately, renegotiation tended to transform many price caps into hybrid regimes,
de-legitimizing the price cap regime, both on grounds of the agreed terms’ speed of change
-less than three years- and of the outcome. All that argues, as a key policy implication,
for reconsidering rate of return regulation or at least a hybrid regulatory scheme, as the
salient choice for the regulatory regime, particularly in volatile environments and where
there is weak regulatory capacity.
The mixed eﬀects of exclusive private ﬁnancing and of minimum income guarantees on
the probability of renegotiation argue for a careful analysis of the tradeoﬀs involved before
granting any guarantees or considering mixed ﬁnancing. Minimum income guarantees do
in principle protect holders of concession contracts against shocks and other unforeseen
contingencies. However, the empirical analysis raises concerns about their eﬀect and leads
to think that such guarantees instead increase the probability of renegotiation by reduc-
ing incentives to behave eﬃciently and by leading the government/regulator to concede
improved terms through renegotiation, in order to avoid calling in the guarantee.
Finally, there are two variables highly signiﬁcant as determinants of renegotiation, for
which policy implications are less clear and point out to implicit risk insurance. These
variables are the political cycle and macroeconomic shocks. While the former is to some
extent predictable, the latter is not. As shown here, political cycles are likely to have
consequences on the occurrence of renegotiations. The policy implications here might be
reduced to incorporating into the contract speciﬁc contingency clauses and guidelines for
political cycle-led renegotiations, so as to reduce uncertainty and risk about the outcome.
As for macroeconomic shocks, they are diﬃcult to predict or to pre-empt, yet likely to
happen during the life of a concession. The policy implications here are limited. This
argues for the need to reduce uncertainty about their impact, for example by incorporating
into the contracts contingency clause triggers and binding guidelines on the adjustment
of tariﬀs and other elements with ﬁnancial implications in the contracts.
In summary, accounting for all those factors in the design of concession contract,
competitive allocation of concessions, and regulatory framework ought to have signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects in reducing conﬂicts, wasteful and rent seeking renegotiations, and improving
transparency and overall sector eﬃciency and welfare.
35Appendix 1
36REFERENCES
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (1994), “Renegotiation Design with
Unveriﬁable Information”, Econometrica, 62(2), 257-282.
Anderlini, L., L. Felli and A. Postlewaite (2000), “Courts of Law, Unforeseen
Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts”, mimeo.
Angrist, J. (1991), “Instrumental Variables Estimation of Average Treatment
Eﬀects in Econometrics and Epidemiology”, National Bureau of Economic
Research Technical Working Paper Number 115.
Aubert, C. and J.J. Laﬀont (2002), “Political Renegotiation of Regulatory
Contracts”, mimeo, Toulouse.
Baron, D. and D. Besanko (1984), “Regulation, Asymmetric Information and
Auditing”, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 267-302.
Becker, G. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal
of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Com-
pensation of Enforcers”, Journal of Legal Studies,3 ,1 - 1 8 .
Bondt, P. (2001), “A Theory of Contractual Incompleteness Based on Judicial
Agency”, mimeo, Northwestern University.
Dewatripont, M. (1986), “Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time
in Optimal Labor Contracts”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 589-
620.
Engel, E., R. Fischer and A. Galetovic (2000), “Franchising of Infrastruc-
ture Concessions in Chile: A Policy Report”, Centro de Econom´ ıa Apli-
cada, Departamento de Ingener´ ıa Industrial, Facultad de Ciencias F´ ısicas
yM a t e m ´ aticas, Universidad de Chile, Serie Econom´ ıa 88.
Engel, E., R. Fischer and A. Galetovic (2001), “Least Present Value of Revenue
Auctions and Highway Franchising”, Journal of Political Economy, 109(5),
993-1020.
G´ omez-Ib´ a˜ nez, A. and R. Meyer (1993), Going Private: The International Ex-
perience with Transport Privatization, Washington: Brooking Institution.
Green, J. and J.J. Laﬀont (1992), “Renegotiation and the Form of Eﬃcient
Contracts”, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 25/26, 123-150.
Guasch, L. (2001), “Concessions and Regulatory Design: Determinants of
Performance-Fifteen Years of Evidence”, mimeo, World Bank and Univer-
sity of California, San Diego.
37Harris, C. (2003), “Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Coun-
tries: Trends, Impacts, and Policy Lessons”, World Bank Working Paper
Number 5, Washington D.C.
Hart, O., and J. Moore (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”,
Econometrica, 56, 755-785.
Hart, O., and J. Tirole (1988), “Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynam-
ics”, Review of Economics Studies, 55, 509-540.
Khalil, F. (1997), “Auditing without Commitment”, Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 28, 629-640.
Klein, M. (1998), “Bidding for Concessions-The Impact of Contract Design”,
Public Policy for the Private Sector, World Bank.
Laﬀont, J.J. (2000a), Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Laﬀont, J.J. (2000b), “Enforcement, Regulation and Development”, to appear
in Journal of African Economies.
Laﬀont, J.J. and D. Martimort (2001), The Theory of Incentives I, The Principal-
Agent Model, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Laﬀont, J.J. and M. Meleu (2002), “Enforcement of Contracts with Adverse
Selection in LDCs”, mimeo, IDEI.
Laﬀont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1990), “Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in
Procurement”, Review of Economic Studies, 75, 597-626.
Laﬀont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation, Third Printing. Cambridge, United States: MIT Press.
Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell (2000), “The Economic Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45-76.
Posner, R. (1972), Economic Analysis of Law, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston.
Rivers, D. and Q. Vuong (1988), “Limited Information Estimators and Exo-
geneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models”, Journal of Econometrics
39, 347-366.
S´ anchez, M. and R. Corona (1993), Privatization in Latin America, Inter-
American Development Bank, John Hopkins University Press, Washington
D.C.
38Segal, I. and M. Whinston (2002), “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism
Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Shar-
ing)”, Econometrica, 70(1), 1-46.
Stigler, G. (1970), “The Optimum Enforcement of Laws”, Journal of Political
Economy, 78, 526-536.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
World Bank (2001), World Development Report 2001, Washington D.C.
3940414243